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ABSTRACT
Given an aftermath of a cascade in the network, i.e. a set VI
of “infected” nodes after an epidemic outbreak or a propaga-
tion of rumors/worms/viruses, how can we infer the sources
of the cascade? Answering this challenging question is crit-
ical for computer forensic, vulnerability analysis, and risk
management. Despite recent interest towards this problem,
most of existing works focus only on single source detection
or simple network topologies, e.g. trees or grids.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to identify in-
fection sources by searching for a seed set S that minimizes
the symmetric difference between the cascade from S and
VI , the given set of infected nodes. Our major result is an
approximation algorithm, called SISI, to identify infection
sources without the prior knowledge on the number of source
nodes. SISI, to our best knowledge, is the first algorithm
with provable guarantee for the problem in general graphs.
It returns a 2
(1−)2 ∆-approximate solution with high prob-
ability, where ∆ denotes the maximum number of nodes in
VI that may infect a single node in the network. Our ex-
periments on real-world networks show the superiority of
our approach and SISI in detecting true source(s), boosting
the F1-measure from few percents, for the state-of-the-art
NETSLEUTH, to approximately 50%.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The explosion of online social networks with billion of
users such as Facebook or Twitter have fundamentally changed
the landscapes of information sharing, nowadays. Unfortu-
nately, the same channels can be exploited to spread rumors
and misinformation that cause devastating effects such as
widespread panic in the general public [1], diplomatic ten-
sions [2], and witch hunts towards innocent people [3].
Given a snapshot of the network with a set VI of infected
nodes who posted the rumors, identifying the set of nodes
who initially spread the rumors is a challenging, yet impor-
tant question, whether for forensic use or insights to prevent
future epidemics. Other applications of infection source de-
tection can be found in finding first computing devices that
get infected with a virus or source(s) of contamination in
water networks.
Despite recent interest towards this problem, termed In-
fection Sources Identifications (ISI), most of existing works
either limit to single source detection [23, 22] or simple net-
Figure 1: Infection sources detection on a 60× 60 grid graph
work topologies, e.g. trees or grids, with ad hoc extensions
to general graphs [20, 26, 27, 23]. A recent work in [25] pro-
vides an MDL-based method, called NETSLEUTH, to detect
both the number of infection sources and the sources them-
selves. However the proposed heuristics seems to only work
well for grid networks and cannot detect any true infection
source. Thus there is lack of a rigorous and accurate method
to detect multiple infection sources in general graphs.
In this paper, we present a new approach to identify mul-
tiple infection sources that looks into both infected and un-
infected nodes. This contradicts to existing methods [20,
25] which limit the attention to the subgraph induced by
the infected nodes. Given a snapshot of network G = (V,E)
and a set of infected nodes VI , we identify the sources by
searching for a set Sˆ that minimize the symmetric difference
between the cascade from S and VI . While our objective, the
symmetric difference, is similar to the one used in k-effector
[20], our novel formulation does not require the knowledge of
the number of infection sources k. In deriving optimization
method for this new approach, we face strong challenges in
developing efficient solution:
• The exponential number, up to 2θ(n) for large VI , of
possible solutions. This makes the exhaustive search
for the case of single source [23, 22, 12] intractable.
• The non-submodular objective. Thus, it is inefficient
to solve the problem through simple greedy methods.
• The stochastic nature of the infection process requires
considering exponentially many possible cascades.
To tackle ISI, we propose SISI, an algorithm that can accu-
rately detect infection sources. We employ in SISI two novel
techniques: a Truncated Reverse Infection Sampling (TRIS)
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method to generate random reachability RR sets that en-
code the infection landscape and a primal-dual algorithm
for the Submodular-cost Covering [18]. SISI, to our best
knowledge, is the first algorithm with provable guarantee for
multiple infection sources detection in general graphs. It
returns an 2
(1−)2 ∆-approximate solution with a high prob-
ability, where ∆ denotes the maximum number of nodes in
VI that may infect the same node in the network. Exper-
iments on real-world networks show the huge leap of SISI
in detecting true infection sources, boosting the true source
discovery rates from merely few percents, for the state-of-
the-art NETSLEUTH, to more than 70%. Thus SISI has both
high empirical performance and theoretical guarantees.
The advantages of SISI over other methods are illustrated
through a cascade on a 60 × 60 grid in Fig. 1. SISI is the
only one which can detect the true infection sources. To
avoid false negative, which is more serious than false posi-
tive, SISI often output slightly more infection sources than
other methods (SISI: 3, NETSLEUTH: 1, Greedy:1, Ground-
truth: 2). However, it maintains a reasonable F1-score of
over 50%.
We summarize our contributions as follows
• We propose a new approach to identify multiple in-
fection sources through minimizing the symmetric dif-
ference between the cascade of the suspected source
nodes S with the infected nodes VI without knowing
the number of sources a priori. Our experiments show
that methods following this approach including our al-
gorithm SISI and the greedy algorithm outperform the
other approaches in terms of detecting true sources.
• To our best knowledge, we propose the first approxi-
mation algorithm, termed SISI, for detecting multiple
infection sources in general graphs and our algorithm
does not require the knowledge on the number of in-
fection sources. Given an approximation error  > 0,
we provide rigorous analysis on sample complexity, de-
riving the necessary number of samples to guarantee a
multiplicative error (1±) on the objective estimation.
• Extensive experiments on real-world networks shows
the superiority of SISI over other approaches in de-
tecting the exact sources under both SI and IC mod-
els. The relax version of SISI is also faster than NET-
SLEUTH while still retaining high-quality solutions.
Related works. Infection Source Identification (ISI) un-
der different names has recently emerged and attracted quite
a number of researchers in multiple disciplines with diverse
techniques. There are two main streams of works and meth-
ods that can be listed: 1) exact algorithms on tree graphs
[26, 27, 23, 20, 11], 2) ad hoc heuristics approaches without
any guarantee for general graphs [25, 23, 22].
In the first stream, Shah and Zaman in [26] established
the notion of rumor-centrality which is an Maximum Like-
lihood estimator on regular trees under the SI model. They
proposed an optimal algorithm to identify the single source
of an epidemic. In [27], the same authors improved the pre-
vious results by deriving the exact expression for the prob-
ability of correct detection. Later Luo et al. [23] based on
approximations of the infection sequences count to develop
an algorithm that can find at most two sources in a geomet-
ric tree. Since solely targeting trees, all these methods are
unable of solving ISI problem on general graphs.
Lappas et al. [20] formulated ISI problem under the name
of k-effector and introduced the minimization of the sym-
metric difference between the observed infection and the re-
sulting cascade if starting from a candidate source set. While
the formulation is novel, their solution is, unfortunately, lim-
ited to tree graphs and require the knowledge of the number
of infection sources. The extension for general graphs by
approximating a graph by a tree does not work well either
as we show later in the experiment section.
Prakash et al. [25] resort to heuristic approach to find
multiple sources in general graphs and propose NETSLEUTH
which relies on the two-part code Minimum Description Length.
They show that NETSLEUTH is able to detect both the
sources and how many of them. However, besides no guar-
antee on solution quality, we show in our experiments that
NETSLEUTH performs poorly on a simple grid graph with
large overlapping region of cascades from two source nodes.
Luo et al. [23] also derived an estimator to find multiple
sources given that the maximum number of sources is pro-
vided. Yet similar to [20], their estimator depends on the
approximation of a general graph to tree and also requires
the maximum number of sources.
There are also other works on related areas: [15] studies
the rumor-centrality estimator on trees under an additional
constraint that the status (infected or not) of a node is re-
vealed with probability p ≤ 1. In case of p = 1, the estima-
tor is able to reproduce the previous results and with large
enough p < 1, it achieves performance within  the optimal.
Under a different model, Chen et al. [9] study the problem of
detecting multiple information sources in networks under the
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model. They propose
an estimator for regular trees that can detect sources within
a constant distance to the real ones with high probability
and investigate a heuristic algorithm for general cases. In
another study [22], Lokhov et al. take the dynamic message-
passing approach under SIR model and introduce an infer-
ence algorithm which is shown to admit good improvement.
Influence maximization problem [16] that find k nodes to
maximize the expected influence is one of the most exten-
sively studied problem. The latest references on the problem
can be found in [29] and the references therein.
Organization. We present our model and problem for-
mulation in Section 2. The hardness and inapproximability
results are provided in Section 2.3. The main algorithm SISI
is proposed in Section 3 while its performance guarantees
and running time are analyzed in Section 4. We provide
comparison on empirical performance of our algorithms and
other approaches in Section 5. Conclusions and extensions
for other settings are discussed in Section 6.
2. MODELS AND PROBLEMDEFINITION
We represent the network in which the infection spreads
as a directed graph G = (V,E) where V is the set of n nodes,
e.g., computers in a computer network, and E is the set of
m directed edges, e.g., connections between the computers.
In addition, we are given a subset VI ⊆ V of observed in-
fected nodes and the remaining nodes are assumed to be not
infected and denoted by V¯I = V \VI .
2.1 Infection Model
We focus on the popular Susceptible-Infected (SI) model.
Susceptible-Infected (SI) model. In this infection
model, each node in the network is in one of two states:
Table 1: Table of Notations
Notation Description
n,m #nodes, #edges of graph G = (V,E).
VI , V¯I Set of infected and uninfected nodes.
β, k Infection probability and k = |VI |.
V (S,M) An infection cascade from S under model M.
D(S,M, VI) Symmetric different on a graph realization.
E[D(S,M, VI)] The expectation of D(S,M, VI) over all realiza-
tions.
Sˆ The returned source set of SISI.
OPT, S∗ The optimal value of E[D(S, τ)] and an optimal
solution set which achieves the optimal value.
Rj , src(Rj) A random RR set and its source node src(Rj).
∆ Maximum size of an RR set (∆ ≤ VI).
c,M c = 2(e− 2) ≈ √2, M = 2k + 1.
Λ Λ = (1 + )2c(ln 2
δ
+ k ln 2 + 1) 1
2
.
1) Susceptible (S) (not yet infected) and 2) Infected (I) (in-
fected and capable of spreading the disease/rumor). Once
infected, the node starts spreading to its neighbors through
their connections. While the initial model were proposed for
a complete graph topology [5], the model can be extended
for arbitrary graph G = (V,E). We assume that the infec-
tion spreads in discrete time steps. At time t = 0, a subset
of nodes, called the infection sources, are infected and the
rest is uninfected. Once a node u gets infected at time t, it
will continuously try to infect its uninfected neighbor v and
succeed with probability 0 < β ≤ 1 from step t+ 1 onwards
until successful. The single parameter β indicates how con-
tagious the infection is and thus the higher, the faster it
contaminates the network.
Other cascade model. In principle, our formulation
and proposed method will work for most progressive diffu-
sion models in which once a node becomes infected, it stays
infected. These include the two popular models Independent
Cascade IC and Linear Threshold (LT) models [16]. Other
non-progressive models can be first converted to a progres-
sive ones as outlined in [8].
For simplicity, we present our method for the SI model
and discuss the extension to the IC and LT models through
changing the sampling method in Subsection 3.1.
Learning model parameters. Learning propagation
model parameters is an important topic and has received a
great amount of interest [17, 28, 14, 21, 19]. Our approaches
can rely on these learning methods to extract influence cas-
cade model parameters from real datasets, e.g., action logs,
connection networks.
2.2 Problem Formulation
Intuitively, given an infection model, denoted by M, the
goal of infection source identification is to identify a set of
source nodes S (unknown size) so that the resulting cascade
originated from nodes in S, within a duration τ > 0, matches
VI as closely as possible.
To formalize the problem, we define a cascade V (S,M) as
the set of infected nodes if we select nodes in S as the sources
(initially infected) under infection model M. Thus, the ob-
jective function which characterizes the aforementioned cri-
teria, termed symmetric difference, is defined as follows,
D(S,M, VI) = |VI\V (S,M)|+ |V¯I ∩ V (S,M)| (1)
Figure 2: Illustration of symmetric difference.
In Eq. 1, the first term |VI\V (S,M)| counts the number of
nodes in VI that are not infected by the propagation spread-
ing from S within a duration τ and the second term indicates
the number of nodes that are “mistakenly” infected during
the same time interval (illustrated in Fig. 2). Together, the
sum measures the similarity between the observed cascade
VI and the cascade causes by the suspected nodes S.
Due to the stochastic nature of the cascade, there are ex-
ponentially many possible cascades for a given set of source
nodes S. Here cascade is used to refer to the set of infected
nodes within τ steps. To account for this, we aggregate the
symmetric difference over the probabilistic space of the pos-
sible cascades spreading from S. Denote by Pr[V (S,M)],
the probability of receiving a particular cascade V (S,M)
within t = τ time steps. We compute the expected symmet-
ric difference as follows,
E[D(S,M, VI)] =
∑
possible V (S,M)
D(S,M, VI) Pr[V (S,M)]
=
∑
possible V (S,M)
(|VI\V (S,M)|+ |V¯I ∩ V (S,M)|) Pr[V (S,M)]
=
∑
u∈VI
Pr[u not infected by S] +
∑
v/∈VI
Pr[v infected by S]
(2)
In the last equation, the ‘infected’ and ‘not infected’ proba-
bilities are w.r.t. a random cascade from S within τ steps.
We now state the problem of identifying the infection
sources as follows.
Definition 1 (Infection Sources Identification).
Given a graph G = (V,E), infection modelM (e.g., β for SI
model), observation set VI of infected nodes, and the dura-
tion of the cascade τ (could be infinity), the Infection Sources
Identification (ISI) problem asks for a set Sˆ of nodes such
that,
Sˆ = arg min
S⊆VI
E[D(S,M, VI)] (3)
While this formulation is similar to [20], we do not require
knowledge on the number of infection sources.
2.3 Hardness and Inapproximability
This subsection shows the NP-hardness and inapproxima-
bility results of the ISI problem. From Def. 1, there are two
major difficulties in finding the sources: 1) first, by a similar
argument to that of the influence maximization problem in
[16], the objective function is #P-hard to compute exactly;
2) second, the objective is non-submodular, i.e., there are no
easy greedy approaches to obtain approximation algorithms.
In fact, we show a stronger inapproximability result in the
below theorem.
Theorem 1. ISI cannot be approximated within a factor
O(2log
1− n) for any  > 0, where n = |V |, unless NP ⊆
DTIME(npolylog(n)).
Proof. To prove Theo. 1, we construct a gap-preserving
polynomial-time reduction which reduces any instance of the
Red-Blue Set Cover problem [7] to an instance of ISI. The
Red-Blue Set Cover problem is defined as follows: an in-
stance of Red-Blue Set Cover problem consists of two dis-
joint sets: R = {r1, ..., rp} of red elements, B = {b1, ..., bq}
of blue elements, and a family T ⊆ 2R∪B of n(n ≥ p, n ≥ q)
subsets of R ∪ B. The problem asks a subfamily C∗ ⊆ T
of subsets that covers all the blue elements but minimum
number of reds,
C∗ = arg min
C⊆T
{|R ∩ (∪|C|i=1Ti)|} (4)
Our polynomial reduction ensures that if the ISI instance
has an O(2log
1− n)-approximate solution S, then there must
be a corresponding O(2log
1− n)-approximate solution of the
Red-Blue Set Cover polynomially induced from S. The re-
duction is grounded on the observation that any solution
of the Red-Blue Set Cover costs at most p - the number
of red elements. Then, based on the result in [7] that the
Red-Blue Set Cover cannot be approximated within a fac-
tor O(2log
1− N ) where N = n4 for any  > 0 unless NP ⊆
DTIME(Npolylog(N)), we obtain the Theorem 1.
We will give a polynomial reduction from an instance of
the Red-Blue Set Cover to an ISI instance with β = 1 and
τ = 1 such that,
(1) The optimal solution of the ISI instance polynomially
infers the optimal solution for the instance of Red-Blue
Set Cover.
(2) If we obtain an O(2log
1− n)-approximate solution for
ISI, we will also have an O(2log
1− n)-approximate so-
lution for the Red-Blue Set Cover instance.
These two conditions are sufficient to conclude that we can-
not approximate the optimal solution of ISI within a factor
O(2log
1− n) unless we can do that for Red-Blue Set Cover.
Thus, the Theorem 1 follows. We will present the reduction
and then prove the satisfaction of each condition.
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Figure 3: Reduction from Red-Blue Set Cover to ISI in which
infected nodes are blue-colored and uninfected nodes are in red.
Given an instance of Red-Blue Set Cover with two sets
R,B and a family T , we suppose all the subsets in T contains
at least a blue element, otherwise we can trivially discard
all those subsets since we never select that type of subsets.
In the reverse way, we also suppose every pair of subset in
T has at least one red element different from each other.
Otherwise we always select/reject both at the same time
without changing the cost, in other words, we can group
together to create one subset. We construct a corresponding
ISI instance consisting of the node set V , the infected set
VI ⊆ V and the set of edges E as follows (depicted in Fig. 3):
• Set of infected nodes VI : For each subset Ti ∈ T , there
is a set V 1I (i) of infected nodes whose number is the
number of blues in Ti. For each blue node Bj in B, we
form a set V 2I (j) of |R|+ 1 infected nodes.
• Set of uninfected nodes V \VI : For each infected node
l in V 2I (j), a set U
j
l of |R| + 1 uninfected nodes is
constructed. We also have a set U0 of p uninfected
nodes corresponding to the red set R in Red-Blue Set
Cover instance.
• Set of edges E: For any pair (u, v) ∈ V 1I (i), we connect
them by an edge, so that the subgraph of nodes in
V 1I (i) is a clique. For each u ∈ Ti ∩ Tj , we connect
the two corresponding nodes in V 1I (i) and V
1
I (j) by an
edge. For each u ∈ V 1I (i), we connect u to all |R| + 1
nodes in V 2I (u) and, subsequently, each node l in V
2
I (u)
is connected to all |R| + 1 nodes in Uul . For any pair
u, v ∈ V 1I (j) for each j ∈ {1, ..., n}, we connect u with
all the nodes in V 2I (v) and v with all the nodes in
V 2I (u). If the subset Ti contains red element Rj , then
for each u ∈ V 1I (i), there is an edge connecting u to
the corresponding node of Rj in U0.
Now, we will prove the two conditions consecutively. Our
proof relies on two observations: the first one is that if the
feasible solution for ISI contains at least an infected node
from V 2I (j) for some j ∈ {1, ..., q}, then the number of un-
infected nodes covered is at least |R| + 1 which causes the
cost to be at least |R|+ 1. The same phenomenon happens
if an infected node v in V 1I (j) for some j ∈ {1, ..., n} is not
covered since there would be |R|+1 infected nodes in V 2I (v)
not covered. On the other hand, if all the infected nodes
in V 1I (j) for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} are covered, then all infected
nodes in the whole network are indeed covered and at most
|R| uninfected nodes (in U0) are also covered. The second
observation with the previous case is that in the original
Red-Blue Set Cover instance, we select those subset Ti such
that the corresponding V 1I (i) contains a infection source cho-
sen in ISI, then the cost in the two problem are equal (cover
the same number of red elements/uninfected nodes).
Prove condition (1). Based on our observation, the op-
timal solution S∗ of the ISI instance has to cover all the
nodes in V 1I (j) for all j and has the least number of un-
infected nodes covered. From this solution, we construct
the solution for the original Red-Blue Set Cover instance by
selecting the subfamily C∗ of subsets Ti such that the cor-
responding V 1I (i) contains a infection source in the optimal
solution of ISI. First, this subfamily covers all the blue ele-
ments since each blue element corresponds to some infected
nodes in V 1I (j) for some j. Secondly, if this subfamily has
the lowest cost (covers the least number of red elements).
Otherwise, suppose that a different subfamily Cˆ has lower
cost, then we can equivalently find another solution for the
reduced ISI instance and obtain the same cost (lower than
that of S∗). That contradicts with the optimality of S∗.
Prove condition (2). Based on condition (1) that the
optimal solution of ISI instance infers the optimal solution of
Ref-Blue Set Cover with the same cost. Suppose we have an
O(2log
1− n)-approximate solution Sˆ for Red-Blue Set Cover
instance, there are two possible cases:
• If Sˆ contains a node in V 2I (j) for some j or Sˆ does
not cover a node in V 1I (j) for some j, then based on
the first observation, the cost of Sˆ has to be at least
|R| + 1. Because this is an O(2log1− n)-approximate
solution, we just select the whole family T in Red-
Blue Set Cover instance which has cost of only |R|
and obtain an O(2log
1− n)-approximate solution.
• Otherwise, based on the second observation, we can
easily construct a solution for Red-Blue Set Cover with
equal cost and thus obtain anO(2log
1− n)-approximate
solution.
Lastly, note that the number of blue and red elements
must be at least |T |, otherwise we can drop or merge some
sets together without effecting any solution. Thus, by fol-
lowing our construction of the ISI instance, we determine the
number of uninfected nodes,
|V | = |U0|+
n∑
i=1
|V 1I (i)|+
q∑
i=1
|V 2I (i)| ·
|R+1|∑
j=1
|U ij |
≤ |T |+ |T |+ |T |2(|T |+ 1) ≤ |T |4 (|T | ≥ 4) (5)
Since |T | = n and the Red-Blue Set Cover cannot be
approximated within a factor of O(2log
1− N ) where N = n4
for any  > 0 unless NP ⊆ DTIME(Npolylog(N)), we obtain
our results in Theo. 1.
3. SAMPLING-BASED SISI ALGORITHM
In this section, we present SISI, our sampling-based method
with guarantee on achieving 2
(1−)2 ∆-approximation factor
for arbitrary small  > 0. Here ∆ equals the maximum nodes
in VI that can infect a single node in the graph and is the
same with the maximum sample size in Subsec. 3.1.
Outline. SISI contains two key components: 1) an effi-
cient Truncated Reverse Infection Sampling (TRIS) to com-
pute the objective with high accuracy and confidentiality
(presented in Subsection 3.1) and 2) an innovative trans-
formation of the studied problem into a submodular-cost
covering problem to provide high quality solutions with per-
formance guarantees (presented in Subsection 3.2). We show
the combination of the two components to obtains the SISI
algorithm in Subsection 3.3.
3.1 Truncated Reverse Infection Sampling
We propose the Truncated Reverse Infection Sampling (TRIS)
strategy to generate random Reverse Reachable (RR) sets,
following the reverse influence sampling method (RIS) pio-
neered in [6]. A RR set, Rj , is generated as follows.
Definition 2 (Reverse Reachable set (RR set)).
Given G = (V,E), probability β and propagation time τ , a
RR set is generated from G by 1) selecting a (uniformly)
random source node v ∈ V , 2) generating a reverse random
cascade from v in G within τ steps and 3) returning Rj as
the set of nodes in the cascade.
The main intuition is that each RR set Rj contains the
nodes that can infect its source v = src(Rj) within a given
time τ . Thus RR sets were used in previous works [6, 29,
24] (without the step/time limit t) to estimate influence of
nodes. We shall show later in next subsection that RR sets
can also be fine-tuned to estimate the chance of being infec-
tion sources.
Note that the above description of generating RR sets is
model-independent, i.e., you can use it with many different
cascade models for reverse cascade simulation in the step
2. For example, the reverse simulation for IC and LT, the
two most popular cascades models, are presented in [6] and
[4], respectively. Here we focus on the reverse sampling for
SI model and highlight the necessary changes to make the
method work for our problem.
Algorithm 1: Fast-TRIS
Input: Graph G, probability β, max time τ and VI
Output: A random RR set Rj
1 Pick a random node u ∈ V
2 RR set Rj = {u}
3 Infection time T{v} =∞, ∀v ∈ V \{u}, T{u} = 0
4 Min priority queue PQ = {u}
5 while PQ not empty do
6 u = PQ.pop()
7 foreach v ∈ (in-neighbors(u)\Rj) ∪ PQ do
8 r ← a random number in [0,1]
9 t← dlog1−β(1− r)e {Assume 0 < β < 1}
10 T (v) = min{T (v), T (u) + t}
11 if T (v) < τ then
12 if v /∈ Rj then
13 if v ∈ VI then
14 Rj = Rj ∪ {v}
15 PQ.push(v)
16 else
17 PQ.update(v)
18 Return Rj
3.1.1 Generating RR Sets under SI model.
The main difference between SI model vs. LT and IC
models are SI model allows multiple attempts for an infected
node to its neighbors in contrast to a single attempt in IC and
LT. Given a network G = (V,E) and infection probability
0 < β ≤ 1, RR sets in the SI model are generated as follows.
1) Select a random node u. Only u is infected at time 0
and all other nodes are not infected.
2) For each time step i ∈ [1, τ ], consider all edges (u, v) ∈
E in which v is infected and u is not infected (note
the direction). Toss a β-head biased coin to determine
whether u succeeds in infecting v. If the coin gives
head (with a probability β), we mark u as infected.
3) After τ steps, return Rj as the set of infected nodes,
removing all nodes that are not in VI .
Note the last step, the nodes that are not in VI will be
removed from the RR set (hence the name truncated). This
truncation is due to the observation that the suspected nodes
must be among the infected nodes in VI . Our RR sets are in
general smaller than the RR sets in [6] and might be empty.
This saves us a considerable amount of memory in storing
the RR sets.
A naive implementation of the above reserve sampling has
a high complexity and does not scale when τ grows, thus we
present a fast implementation using geometric distribution
in Algorithm 1.
The complete pseudocode for the fast TRIS algorithm is
described in Alg. 1. The key observation to speed up the
TRIS procedure is that each trial in the sequence of infec-
tion attempts is a Bernoulli experiment with success proba-
bility of β. Thus this sequence of attempts until successful
actually follows a geometric distribution. Instead of tossing
the Bernoulli coin many times until getting a head, we can
toss once and use the geometric distribution to determine
the number of Bernoulli trials until successful (Lines 8,9).
Another issue is the order of attempts since a node can
be infected from any of her in-neighbors but only the earli-
est one counts. Therefore, we will keep the list of all newly
infected nodes in a min priority queue (PQ) w.r.t infection
time. In each iteration, the top node is considered (Lines 6).
The algorithm behaves mostly like the legacy Dijkstra’s al-
gorithm [13] except we have time for a node w to infect
a node v on each edge (w, v) instead of the length. Also,
the algorithm is constrained within the region consisting of
nodes at most ‘distance’ τ from the selected u.
The time complexities of the naive and fast implementa-
tion of TRIS are stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Expected time complexity of the naive TRIS is,
C(Rj) =
∆mτ
n
(6)
and that of the fast implementation is,
C′(Rj) =
∆m
n
+ ∆ log(∆) log(1 +
∆m
n2
) (7)
Proof. Similar to the analysis of Expected Performance
of Dijkstra’s Shortest Path Algorithm in [13] and denote
the expected complexity of the fast algorithm by C′(Rj),
we have,
C′(Rj) = C(edges) + ∆ log(∆) log(1 + C(edges)/n) (8)
where C(edges) is the expected number of edges examined.
Note that this is different from C(Rj) since in this case, each
edge can be checked once while, for the latter, it is multiple
until successful. ∆ is defined previously as the maximum
size of a RR set. We also have,
C(edges) ≤ 1
n
∑
u∈V
∑
v∈V
Pr[u, v]din(v) ≤ ∆m
n
(9)
in which the details are similar to that of Eq. 6. Thus,
combining with Eq. 8, we obtain,
C′(Rj) =
∆m
n
+ ∆ log(∆) log(1 +
∆m
n2
) (10)
In Eq. 7, the first term is usually the leading factor and,
then, the complexity depends mostly on ∆m
n
. We now ana-
lyze the expected time complexity C(Rj) of generating Rj
by the naive way.
C(Rj) ≤ τ
n
∑
u∈V
∑
v∈V
Pr[u, v]din(v) =
τ
n
∑
v∈V
din(v)
∑
u∈V
Pr[u, v]
where Pr[u, v] is the probability of v infected by u within τ
steps, din(v) is the in-degree of v. Here we take the aver-
age over all possible sources u of Rj (each has probability
1/n) and the maximum number of edge checks for node v is
τdin(v). Let denote the maximum size of a random RR set
as ∆, we get
∑
u∈V Pr[u, v] ≤ ∆ and thus,
C(Rj) ≤ τ
n
∑
v∈V
din(v)∆ =
∆τ
n
∑
v∈V
din(v) =
∆mτ
n
(11)
From Eq. 6, the complexity depends linearly on τ and is
very high with large values of τ .
Thus, the running time C′(Rj) of our fast implementa-
tion is roughly τ times smaller than that C(Rj) of the naive
implementation, especially, for large values of τ .
3.1.2 Chance of Being Infection Sources
We show how to utilize the generated RR sets to estimate
the chance that nodes being infection sources. First, we
classify each generated RR Rj into one of the two groups,
based on the source of Rj , denoted by src(Rj).
• RBlue = {Rj |src(Rj) ∈ VI}: The set of blue RR sets
that sources are.
• RRed = {Rj |src(Rj) /∈ VI}: The set of red RR sets
that sources are not in VI .
Since the infection sources infect the nodes in VI but not
the nodes outside of VI (within a time τ), thus, the infection
sources should appear frequently in blue RR sets (of which
sources are in VI) and appear infrequently in red RR sets (of
which sources are not in VI .) Thus, a node v that appear in
many blue RR and few red RR sets will be more likely to be
among the infection sources.
The above observation can be generalized for a given a
subset of nodes S ⊂ VI , e.g., a subset of suspected nodes.
A subset S that covers (i.e. to intersect with) many blue
RR sets and few red RR sets will be more likely to be the
infection sources.
Define the following two subgroups of RR sets,
R−Blue(S) = {Rj |Rj ∈ RBlue and Rj ∩ S=∅}, and (12)
R+Red(S) = {Rj |Rj ∈ RRed and Rj ∩ S 6=∅}. (13)
They are the blue RR sets that a suspected subset S “fails”
to cover (i.e. to intersect with) and the red RR sets that S
(“mistakenly”) covers. The less frequent a random RR set
Rj falls into one of those two subgroups, the more likely S
will be the infection sources.
Formally, we can prove that the probability of a random
RR set falls into one of those two subgroups equals exactly
our objective function, denoted by E[D(Sˆ, τ, VI)]. We state
the result in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given a fixed set S ∈ VI , for a random RR set
Rj, denote Xj a random variable such that,
Xj =
{
1 if Rj ∈ R−Blue(S) or Rj ∈ R+Red(S)
0 otherwise
(14)
then,
E[Xj ] =
E[D(S, τ, VI)]
n
(15)
Proof. Since for a random RR set Rj , Rj ∈ R−Blue(S)
and Rj ∈ R+Red(S) are two mutually exclusive events,
E[Xj ] = Pr
Rj
[Rj ∈ R−Blue(S)] + Pr
Rj
[Rj ∈ R+Red(S)] (16)
We will prove an equivalent formula of Eq. 15 that,
E[D(S, τ)] = n(Pr
Rj
[Rj ∈ R−Blue(S)] + Pr
Rj
[Rj ∈ R+Red(S)])
Let define G as a realization of the graph G, G ∼ G, where
each edge (u, v) is assigned a length value indicating the
number of trials u has to make until v gets infected from u.
In one realization G, the cascade from S at time τ , V (S, τ),
is uniquely defined (the reachable nodes from S within τ -
length path) and so as D(S, τ). According to the definition
of E[D(S, τ)] in Eq. 2, we have,
E[D(S, τ)] =
∑
u∈VI
Pr
G∼G
[u not infected] +
∑
v/∈VI
Pr
G∼G
[v infected]
Let denote Rj(u) be a random RR set rooted at u, the
first term in the right-hand side is equivalent to,∑
u∈VI
Pr
G∼G
[u not infected] =
∑
u∈VI
Pr
Rj(u)`G
[S ∩Rj(u) = ∅]
where Rj(u) ` G denotes the consistency of Rj(u) to G since
G is a realization of G and thus Rj(u) is well-defined. Since,
Pr
Rj(u)`G
[S ∩Rj(u) = ∅] = Pr
Rj
[S ∩Rj = ∅ | src(Rj) = u]
we obtain,∑
u∈VI
Pr
G∼G
[u not infected] =
∑
u∈VI
Pr
Rj
[S ∩Rj = ∅ | src(Rj) = u]
=
∑
u∈VI
PrRj [S ∩Rj = ∅ & src(Rj) = u]
PrRj [src(Rj) = u]
=
∑
u∈VI
Pr
Rj
[S ∩Rj = ∅ & src(Rj) = u] · n
(since the source of each RR set is randomly chosen)
= n
∑
u∈VI
Pr
Rj
[S ∩Rj = ∅ & src(Rj) = u]
= nPr
Rj
[S ∩Rj = ∅ & src(Rj) ∈ VI ] (17)
= nPr
Rj
[Rj ∈ R−Blue(S)] (18)
The Eq. 17 follows from the fact that, for all u ∈ VI , (S ∩
Rj = ∅ & src(Rj) = u) are mutually exclusive. Thus,∑
u∈VI
Pr
G∼G
[u not infected] = nPr
Rj
[Rj ∈ R−Blue(S)] (19)
Similarly, we can also achieve,∑
v∈V¯I
Pr
G∼G
[v infected] = nPr
Rj
[Rj ∈ R+Red(S)] (20)
From Eq. 19, Eq. 20 and Eq. 16, we obtain
E[D(S, τ)] = n(Pr
Rj
[Rj ∈ R−Blue(S)] + Pr
Rj
[Rj ∈ R+Red(S)])
which completes the proof of Lem. 2.
Lem. 2 suggests a two-stages approach to identify the in-
fection sources: 1) generating many RR sets and 2) look for
a subset S ⊂ VI that minimize the size of |R−Blue(S) ∪Rj ∈
R+Red(S)|. In next two subsections, we address two key is-
sues of this approach 1) Optimization method to identify S
with guarantees and 2) Sample complexity, i.e., how many
RR sets is sufficient to generate a good solution. Too few RR
sets lead to biased and poor solutions, while too many RR
set lead to high running time.
3.2 Submodular-cost Covering
We will transform the ISI problem to a submodular-cost
covering problem over the generated RR sets. This allows us
to apply the ∆-approximation algorithm in [18], where ∆ is
the maximum size of any RR set.
By Lemma 2, the problem of minimizing E[D(S,M, VI)]
can be cast as a minimization problem of Pr[Rj ∈ R−Blue(S)∪
R+Red(S)]. This, in turn, can be approximated with the fol-
lowing problem over the generated RR sets.
min
S⊆VI
|R−Blue(S) ∪R+Red(S)|, (21)
and, since Rj ∈ R−Blue(S) and Rj ∈ R+Red(S) are disjoint,
the above minimization problem is equivalent to,
min
S⊆VI
|R−Blue(S)|+ |R+Red(S)| (22)
We shall convert the above problem to the submodular-
cost covering in [18], stated as follows.
Definition 3 (Submodular-cost covering). [18] An
instance is a triple (c, C, U) where
• The cost function c(x) : Rn≥0 → R≥0 is submodular,
continuous, and non-decreasing.
• The constraint set C ⊆ 2R≥0 is a collection of covering
constraints, where each constraint S ∈ C is a subset of
Rn≥0.
• For each j ∈ [n], the domain Uj for variable xj is any
subset of R≥0.
The problem is to find x ∈ Rn≥0, minimizing c(x) subject to
xj ∈ Uj , ∀j ∈ [n] and x ∈ S,∀S ∈ C.
Figure 4: Conversion to Submodular-cost covering.
Conversion to submodular-cost covering problem.
We convert the form in Eq. 22 into a submodular-cost cov-
ering problem as demonstrated in Fig. 4. Let q = |RBlue|
and p = |RRed|. We associate a variable xu ∈ [0, 1] for each
u ∈ VI to indicate whether the corresponding node is se-
lected as an infected source. We also assign a variable yj to
each RR setRj ∈ RBlue. We require all blue RRRj sets to be
covered through the constraint max{maxu∈Rj xu, yj} ≥ 1.
Thus for each blue Rj either xv = 1 for some v ∈ Rj or the
corresponding yj = 1.
The objective is to minimize the cost function minx,y c(x, y) =∑
Rj∈RRed maxu∈Rj (xu) +
∑q
j=1 yj . The first part of the
cost function maxu∈Rj (xu) is a submodular function since
the max function is submodular (see footnote 1, page 2 in
[18]). The second part
∑q
j=1 yj is a linear function, and thus
is also a submodular function. Therefore, the objective is a
submodular function.
Thus, the problem in Eq. 22 can be converted to the fol-
lowing submodular-cost covering problem,
min
x,y
c(x, y) =
∑
Rj∈RRed
max
u∈Rj
(xu) +
q∑
j=1
yj (23)
subject to (for each Rj ∈ RBlue) max{max
u∈Rj
xu, yj} ≥ 1
Since for any assignment of variable set x, we have a cor-
responding source selection: node u is selected as infection
source if xu = 1. The first term
∑
Rj∈RRed maxu∈Rj (xu)
in Eq. 23 is equivalent to |R+Red(S)| in Eq. 22 and simi-
larly
∑q
j=1 yj together with the constraints is equivalent to
|R−Blue(S)|. In Eq. 23, each covering constraint is associated
with a blue RR set Rj and says that if Rj is not covered by
any variable xu (xu = 1), then yj = 1 which will increase
the cost function by 1. Thus, Eq. 23 minimizes the number
of red RR sets covered and blue RR sets uncovered. ∆-
Algorithm 2: Submodular-cost-Covering
Input: Infected set VI , collection of RR sets R
Output: An ∆-approximate set Sˆ
1 Formulate the submodular cost covering version from R
2 xu = 0, ∀u ∈ VI and yj = 0, ∀j : Rj ∈ RBlue
3 foreach Rj ∈ RBlue do
4 θ = min
u∈Rj
∑
Rt∈R+Red(u)
(1− max
v∈Rt
xv)
5 θ = min{θ, 1− yj}
6 foreach u ∈ Rj do
7 if R+Red(u) = ∅ then
8 xu = 1
9 else
10 xu =
1
|R+
Red
(u)|
(
θ +
∑
Rt∈R+Red(u)
max
v∈Rt
xv
)
11 yj = yj + θ
12 Add u into Sˆ if xu = 1
13 Return Sˆ
Approximation Algorithm. Our reformulation of ISI to
submodular-cost covering problem is similar to that of the
facility location problem in Section 7 of [18]. According to
Lemma 5 in [18], the following greedy algorithm (Alg. 2)
runs in linear time with respect to the total size of all the
RR sets and returns an ∆-approximate solution.
Theorem 2. Alg. 2 returns an ∆-approximate solution
for the submodular-cost covering formulation of the ISI prob-
lem, where ∆ is the maximum size of an RR set (thus,
∆ ≤ VI), and runs in linear time.
The Alg. 2 starts with formulating the submodular-cost
covering problem from VI and R by creating the necessary
variables, cost function and constraints as specified previ-
ously. A variable xu is initialized to 0 and gets updated in
the iterations that node u is in the RR set considering in
those iterations. The algorithm passes through all the RR
sets Rj ∈ RBlue and makes each of them satisfied in a sin-
gle iteration in which it calculates the minimum increase θ
of the cost function (Line 4-5) that satisfies the constraint.
This minimum increase is computed by sequentially trying
to raise each variable xu : u ∈ Rj or yj to 1 (covering) and
calculating the corresponding cost. Afterwards, it updates
each variable of Rj by an amount that makes the cost func-
tion increased by θ (Line 6-11). At the end, it selects the
nodes in VI that have value 1 in their variables (Line 12).
Algorithm 3: SISI Algorithm
Input: Graph G = (V,E), infection probability β, a set
of infected nodes VI , an infection model M and
, δ ∈ (0, 1).
Output: Initial infected set Sˆ.
1 Λ = (1 + )2c
[
ln 2
δ
+ k ln 2 + 1
]
1
2
2 T = Λ,R ← ∅
3 repeat
4 Generate T additional RR sets by Fast-TRIS (or the
reverse sampling in [6, 24] for IC, LT models)
5 Sˆ = Submodular-cost-Covering(VI ,R)
6 T = |R|
7 ∆ = maxRj |Rj |
8 if  > 1/(1 + ∆) then
9  = 1/(1 + ∆)
10 Λ = (1 + )2c
[
ln 2
δ
+ k ln 2 + 1
]
1
2
11 until |R−Blue(Sˆ)|+ |R+Red(Sˆ)| ≥ Λ;
12 Post-optimization(Sˆ)
13 Return Sˆ
3.3 SISI Approximation Algorithm
We will describe the approximation algorithm, named SISI,
which combines the three key advanced components: TRIS
sampling (Subsec. 3.1), the ∆-approximate submodular-cost
covering algorithm (Subsec. 3.2) and a stopping condition
in [24], to solve the ISI problem and returns an ∆ 2
(1−)2 -
approximate solution with at least (1−δ)-probability (proved
in Sec. 4). The description of SISI is given in Alg. 3.
SISI begins with initializing Λ which will decide the stop-
ping condition (Line 11). The whole algorithm iterates through
multiple steps: in the first step, it generates Λ RR sets
and add them to R since, to satisfy the stopping condi-
tion (Line 11), we need at least Λ RR sets; in subsequent
iterations, the algorithm doubles the number of RR sets in
R by generating |R| more. In each iteration, it utilizes the
submodular-cost covering algorithm to find the candidate
set Sˆ (Line 5) and check whether we have sufficient statis-
tical evidence to achieve a good solution by checking the
stopping condition (Line 11). The stopping condition plays
a decisive roles in both theoretical solution quality and the
complexity of the algorithm. The condition in SISI is de-
rived from the results of optimal sampling for Monte-Carlo
estimation studied in [10]. In the next section, we will prove
that with this stopping condition, SISI returns an ∆ 2
(1−)2 -
approximate solution with probability of at least (1 − δ),
where , δ are given as inputs. The check in Lines 8-10 is to
guarantee  small enough and described in Sec. 4. At the
end of the algorithm, SISI performs a post-optimization of
Sˆ which incrementally removes nodes in Sˆ if that improves
the objective function.
4. ALGORITHM ANALYSIS
We will analyze the approximation guarantee and time
complexity of SISI algorithm. In short, we prove that SISI
returns an ∆ 2
(1−)2 -approximate solution. In the sequel, we
will present the time complexity of SISI.
4.1 Approximation Guarantee
To prove the approximation guarantee of SISI, we show
two intermediate results: 1) with nΛE[D(Sˆ)] RR sets where Sˆ is
the solution returned by SISI, E[D(Sˆ)] = E[D(Sˆ,M, VI)] for
short since the M, VI are fixed, all the sets S ⊂ VI are well
approximated from R with high probability (Lem. 3) and
2) the actual number of RR sets generated in SISI is greater
than nΛE[D(Sˆ)] with high probability (Lem. 4). Then, combine
these results and the property of submodular-cost covering,
we obtain the approximation factor in Theo. 3.
Denote DR(S) = n|R| (|R−Blue(S)| + |R+Red(S)|), which is
an approximation of E[D(S)], achieved from the collection
of RR sets R. The following lemma states the approxima-
tion quality of a set S ⊆ VI . We assume that E[D(Sˆ)] 6=
0, ∀Sˆ ⊂ VI since the case of equaling 0 only happens if VI
is a disconnected clique with edge weights being all 1 and
then, every set S ∈ VI are exactly identical. In that case,
the sources can be any set of nodes and are intractable to
identify.
Lemma 3. If we have T ∗ = nΛE[D(Sˆ)] RR sets where Sˆ is
the solution returned by SISI, then for a set S ⊆ VI ,
Pr[|DR(S)− E[D(S)]| ≥ 
√
E[D(S)] · E[D(Sˆ)]] ≤ δ
M
where M = 2k + 1 and k = |VI |.
Proof. First, for a subset S ⊆ VI and a random RR set
Rj , recall the binary random variable Xj in Eq. 14 that,
Xj =
{
1 if Rj ∈ R−Blue(S) ∪R+Red(S)
0 otherwise.
(24)
Thus, the series of RR sets in R corresponds to a sequence of
samples of Xj , denoted by {X1j , X2j , . . . }. Intuitively, since
the RR are generated independently, the resulted sample se-
quence of Xj should also be independent and identically
distributed in [0, 1]. However, similar to the Stopping Rule
Algorithm in [10] that SISI creates a dependency on the sam-
ples by stopping the algorithm when some condition is sat-
isfied. SISI jumps to the next round when |R−Blue(Sˆ)| +
|R+Red(Sˆ)| ≥ Λ or
∑|R|
i=1 X
i
j ≥ Λ is not met and hence,
whether we generate more samples depending on the current
set of RR sets. Interestingly, similar to the case of Stopping
Rule Algorithm in [10], the sequence {X1j , X2j , . . . } forms a
martingle and the following results follow from [10]:
Let X1j , X
2
j , ... samples according to Xj random variable
in the interval [0, 1] with mean µXj and variance σ
2
Xj
form
a martingale and µˆXj =
1
T
∑T
i=1 X
i
j be an estimate of µXj ,
for any fixed T > 0, 0 ≥  ≥ 1,
Pr[µˆXj ≥ (1 + )µXj ] ≤ e
−TµXj 
2
2c (25)
and,
Pr[µˆXj ≤ (1− )µXj ] ≤ e
−TµXj 
2
2c . (26)
Recall that the value of DR(S) is equivalent to,
DR(S) =
n
|R|
|R|∑
i=1
Xij (27)
Denote µˆS =
1
|R|
∑|R|
i=1 X
i
j which is an estimate of µS =
1
n
E[D(S)], then T ∗ = Λ
µ
Sˆ
and the inequality in Lem. 3 can
be rewritten,
Pr[|µˆS − µS | ≥ √µSˆµS ] ≤
δ
M
(28)
Now, apply the inequality in Eq. 26 on the left side of the
above Eq. 28, we have,
Pr[µˆS ≤ (1− 
√
µSˆ
µS
)µS ] ≤ e
−T∗µS2µSˆ
2cµS = e−(ln(2/δ)+k ln 2+1)
Since k ln 2 + 1 > ln(2k + 1), we obtain,
Pr[µˆS ≤ µS − √µSˆµS ] ≤
δ
2(2k + 1)
=
δ
2M
(29)
Similarly, by applying the inequality in Eq. 25, we obtain
the following,
Pr[µˆS ≥ µS + √µSˆµS ] ≤
δ
2(2k + 1)
=
δ
2M
(30)
Combining Eq. 29 and Eq. 30 proves Lem. 3.
Lem. 3 states that if we have at least T ∗ = nΛE[D(Sˆ)] RR sets
then a set S ⊂ VI is approximated within an additive error
of 
√
µSˆµS with probability (1− δM ). As a consequence, the
next lemma shows that SISI generates at least T ∗ RR set,
thus the approximation of S ⊆ VI in SISI is also good.
Lemma 4 (Stopping condition). The number of RR
sets generated by SISI when it stops satisfies,
Pr[|R| ≤ T ∗] ≤ δ
M
(31)
Proof. We also define the random variable Xj , samples
{X1j , X2j , . . . } for the set Sˆ returned by SISI similar to the
proof of Lem. 3. Starting from the left-hand side of Eq. 31,
we manipulate as follows,
Pr[|R| ≤ T ∗] = Pr[
|R|∑
i=1
Xij ≤
T∗∑
i=1
Xij ] (32)
Since |R−Blue(Sˆ)|+|R+Red(Sˆ)| =
∑|R|
i=1 X
i
j and SISI stops when
|R−Blue(Sˆ)|+ |R+Red(Sˆ)| ≥ Λ, Eq. 32 is equivalent to,
Pr[|R| ≤ T ∗] ≤ Pr[Λ ≤
T∗∑
i=1
Xij ] = Pr[
n
T ∗
Λ ≤ n
T ∗
T∗∑
i=1
Xij ]
= Pr[∆
n
T ∗
Υ(1 + ) ≤ n
T ∗
T∗∑
i=1
Xij ] (33)
Recall that T ∗ = nΥE[D(Sˆ)] or E[D(Sˆ)] =
nΥ
T∗ and, thus,
Pr[|R| ≤ T ∗] ≤ Pr[E[D(Sˆ)](1 + ) ≤ n
T ∗
T∗∑
i=1
Xij ]
= Pr[E[D(Sˆ)](1 + ) ≤ DT∗(Sˆ)] (34)
From Lem. 3, if we have T ∗ RR sets, we obtain,
Pr[DR(S) ≥ E[D(S)] + 
√
E[D(S)] · E[D(Sˆ)]] ≤ δ
M
for set S. Replacing S by Sˆ gives,
Pr[DT∗(Sˆ) ≥ E[D(Sˆ)] + E[D(Sˆ)]] ≤ δ
M
The left side is exactly the Eq. 34 and thus,
Pr[|R| ≤ T ∗] ≤ δ
M
(35)
That completes the proof of Lem. 4.
Based on Lem. 3 and Lem. 4, we are sufficient to prove
the ∆ 2
(1−)2 -approximation factor of SISI.
Theorem 3. Let OPT = E[D(S∗)] be the optimal value
of E[D(S)] at S∗. SISI returns an ∆ 2
(1−)2 -approximate so-
lution Sˆ with probability of at least (1− δ) or,
Pr[E[D(Sˆ)] ≤ ∆ 2
(1− )2OPT ] ≥ 1− δ (36)
Proof. From Lem. 3, we obtain,
Pr[|DR(S)− E[D(S)]| ≥ 
√
E[D(S)] · E[D(Sˆ)]] ≤ δ
M
for a particular subset S ⊆ VI if there are at least T ∗ RR
sets. Furthermore, Lem. 4 states that SISI generates at least
T ∗ RR sets with probability at least δ
M
. Taking union bound
over all subsets S ⊆ VI (note that there are 2k such subsets)
to the above probability and the probability of SISI gener-
ating at least T ∗ RR sets in Lem. 4, we achieve,
Pr[|DR(S)− E[D(S)]| ≥ 
√
E[D(S)] · E[D(Sˆ)]] ≤ δ
for every set S. Thus, both
DR(Sˆ) ≥ E[D(Sˆ)]− E[D(Sˆ)] (37)
and
DR(S
∗) ≤ OPT + 
√
OPT · E[D(Sˆ)] (38)
happen with probability at least (1− δ). Plugging DR(Sˆ) ≤
∆DR(S∗) achieved by submodular-cost covering to Eq. 38,
DR(Sˆ) ≤ ∆(OPT + 
√
OPT · E[D(Sˆ)]) (39)
then combining with Eq. 37 gives,
E[D(Sˆ)]− E[D(Sˆ)] ≤ ∆(OPT + 
√
OPT · E[D(Sˆ)])
or
E[D(Sˆ)]
OPT
≤ ∆
1− − ∆
√
OPT
E[D(Sˆ)]
(40)
This inequality is valid only when 1 −  − ∆
√
OPT
E[D(Sˆ)] >
0 which means  < 1/(1 + ∆
√
OPT
E[D(Sˆ)] ). Since  is a free
parameter, we can choose  ≤ 1/(1 + ∆) and satisfy the
condition. By considering
√
E[D(Sˆ)]
OPT
as a variable and solve
the quadratic inequality with  ≤ 1/(1 + ∆), we obtain,
E[D(Sˆ)]
OPT
≤ ∆ 2
(1− )2 (41)
which states the ∆ 2
(1−)2 approximation factor of SISI and
happens with probability at least (1− δ).
4.2 Time Complexity
This subsection analyzes the time complexity of SISI. We
analyze major procedures of the algorithm: 1) submodular-
cost covering algorithm and 2) generating RR sets.
4.2.1 Submodular-cost covering algorithm
Recall that the total sizes of the generated RR sets is Λ on
the average. Since the algorithm for solving the procedure
to solve submodular-cost covering problem keeps doubling
the number of RR sets after each round,the total complexity
of this procedure is bounded loosely by O(Λ2).
4.2.2 Generating RR sets
To determine the time complexity of generating RR sets
in SISI, we need analyze the time spent for generating a
single RR set (Lemma 1) and the expected number of RR
sets. Then multiplying two numbers to get the expected
total complexity. The following lemma states the complexity
results with the proof in our extended version [4].
Lemma 5. Let Es be the set of edges connecting nodes in
VI to nodes in V¯I , the complexity of generating RR sets in
SISI is O(mΛ∆/|Es|)
Proof. Generating a RR Set. As analyzed in Sec. 3,
the expected complexity of generating a single RR set is as
follows,
C′(Rj) =
∆m
n
+ ∆ log(∆) log(1 +
∆m
n2
) ≈ ∆m
n
(42)
Number of RR set generated. We will find an upper-bound
for the number of RR sets generated by SISI. Using Wald’s
equation [30], and that E[|R|] <∞ we have
E[|R|]µSˆ = Λ (43)
Thus,
E[|R|] = Λ
µSˆ
=
Λn
E[D(Sˆ, τ, VI)]
(44)
Let Es be the set of edges connecting nodes in VI to nodes
in V¯I , then we have
E[D(Sˆ, τ, VI)] ≥
∑
(u,v)∈Es
[
(1− Pr[Sˆ, u]) + Pr[Sˆ, v]] (45)
where (1 − Pr[Sˆ, u]) is the probability that u ∈ VI is not
infected and Pr[Sˆ, v] is the probability that v ∈ VI¯ is in-
fected. Since v is uninfected and connected with u, if u is
infected by Sˆ, then the probability that v gets the infection
from u is Pr[Sˆ, v] = β Pr[Sˆ, u]. Taking into the probabil-
ity that u is infected at least 1 step before τ , we obtain
Pr[Sˆ, v] ≥ β Pr[Sˆ, u]/(1 − β) due to the binomial distribu-
tion of successes up to τ and τ − 1. Thus,
E[D(Sˆ, τ, VI)] ≥
∑
(u,v)∈Es
(1− Pr[Sˆ, u] + β
1− β Pr[Sˆ, u])
= |Es| − (1− β
1− β )
∑
(u,v)∈Es
Pr[Sˆ, u] ≥ β
1− β |Es| (46)
(a) |VI | = 100 (b) |VI | = 500 (c) |VI | = 1000
Figure 5: F1-measure scores of different algorithms. Higher is better.
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Figure 6: Runtime of the tested algorithms
Combining this result with Eq. 44, we obtain,
E[|R|] ≤ (1− β)Λn
β|Es| (47)
From Eq. 42 and Eq. 47, we obtains the complexity of
generating RR sets.
Therefore, the overall complexity of SISI is followed by the
subsequent theorem.
Theorem 4. Let Es be the set of edges connecting nodes
in VI to V¯I , SISI has O(m∆Λ/|Es|+ Λ2) time complexity.
From Theo. 4, we see that the complexity depends on the
number of connections from infected set to the outside world
|Es|. That is if there are many infected nodes connected to
uninfected nodes, it is easier for SISI to find the sources and
vice versus, if only few such connections, SISI requires more
time.
5. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we study the empirical performance of SISI
and compare it with the current state-of-the-art methods
under the popular SI and IC infection models. We show
that SISI outperform the others in terms of detection quality,
revealing major of the infection sources. In contrast, the
other methods rarely find any true source of the infection.
5.1 Experimental Settings
5.1.1 Algorithms compared
Under the SI model, we compare three groups of methods:
• SISI, a relaxed version of SISI, termed SISI-relax, in
which we relax the approximation guarantee of SISI by
replacing (k ln 2) in Υ by a smaller constant ln(2× k)
and the natural naive Greedy algorithm which itera-
tively selects one node at a time that commits the
largest marginal decrease of symmetric difference. The
purpose of designing SISI-relax is to test the empirical
performance changes if we have fewer RR sets.
• NETSLEUTH [25] which is the existing best algorithm
in general graphs however it fails to provide any guar-
antee on solution quality.
• Max-Degree based method which ranks node degrees
and iteratively selects nodes with highest degree until
increasing the symmetric difference as the solution.
Under the IC model, we compare SISI with k-effector [20]
and the naive Max-Degree algorithm on IC model.
For SISI and SISI-relax, we set the parameters  = 0.1, δ =
0.01. For k-effector, k is set to the number of true sources.
5.1.2 Quality measures
To evaluate the solution quality, we adopt three measures:
• Symmetric difference (E[D(S, τ, VI)]) which is sepa-
rately calculated with high accuracy ( = 0.01, δ =
0.001) through generating random RR sets as in Sub-
section 3.1.
• Jaccard distance based QJD [25]:
QJD(S) =
E[JDS(VI)]
E[JDS∗(VI)]
(48)
where E[JDS(VI)] is the average Jaccard distance of
S w.r.t. VI and computed by generating many (10000
in our experiments) infection simulations from S and
|VI | 100 500 1000
#sources 1 5 10 20 1 5 10 20 1 5 10 20
Symmetric
Difference
(smaller is
better)
Ground-truth 205 173 156 134 1006 945 938 767 2026 1835 1945 1520
SISI 211 181 168 142 1013 962 971 792 2049 1873 1959 1541
SISI-relax 246 215 218 202 1141 993 1084 854 2179 1903 2012 1696
NETSLEUTH 294 273 280 247 1258 1147 1193 971 2297 2095 2248 1751
Greedy 261 226 231 219 1152 1015 1067 914 2218 2214 2124 1707
Max-Degree 281 325 418 387 1195 1091 1206 1105 2221 2167 2182 1876
Jaccard
Distance
(larger is
better)
Ground-truth 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SISI 0.92 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.82 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.95
SISI-relax 0.76 0.72 0.65 0.71 0.81 0.79 0.72 0.89 0.86 0.68 0.72 0.73
NETSLEUTH 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.37 0.16 0.29 0.26 0.41 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.21
Greedy 0.32 0.19 0.39 0.35 0.26 0.28 0.34 0.37 0.22 0.26 0.21 0.19
Max-Degree 0.32 0.35 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.12
Table 2: Comparison on Symmetric Difference and Jaccard-based Distance of different methods.
averaging over the Jaccard similarities between the in-
fected sets and VI . S
∗ contains the true sources.
• F1-measure:
PR(S) =
|S ∩ {true sources}|
2|S| +
|S ∩ {true sources}|
2|{true sources}|
This accurately captures our ultimate goal of ISI prob-
lem: finding both the true sources and the correct
number of sources. We also define true source detec-
tion rate (%) as 100 |S∩{true sources}||{true sources}| .
Both QJD(S) and PR(S) are ranging in [0, 1] and larger is
better. E[D(S, τ, VI)] is nonnegative and smaller is better.
5.1.3 Datasets
For experimental purposes, we select a moderate-size real
network - NetHEPT with 15233 nodes and 62796 edges that
is actually the largest dataset ever tested on ISI problem.
We comprehensively carry experiments on NetHEPT with
various numbers of sources {1, 5, 10, 20}, chosen uniformly
random, and the propagation time τ is chosen so that the
infection sizes reach (or exceed) predefined values in the set
{100, 500, 1000}. For each pair of the two values, we gener-
ated 10 random test cases with β = 0.05 and then ran each
method on these random tests and took the average of each
quality measure over 10 such results.
5.1.4 Testing Environments
We implement SISI, SISI-relax, Greedy and Max-Degree
methods in C++, NETSLEUTH is in Matlab code and ob-
tained from the authors of [25]. We experiment on a Linux
machine with an 8 core 2.2 GHz CPU and 100GB RAM.
5.2 Experiments on real network and SImodel
Comparing solution quality. The solution quality mea-
sured are the true infection sources discovery rate, symmet-
ric difference (our objective) and Jaccard-based distance [25]
True source discovery. Fig. 5 reports the F1-measure
scores of the tested algorithms. Note that this score has not
been used in previous works [25, 23] since previous meth-
ods can only find nodes that are within few hops from the
sources, but not the sources themselves. As shown in the
figure, SISI and SISI-relax have the best performance. More
than 50% of the true sources was discovered by SISI and 35%
by SISI-relax that exquisitely surpass NETSLEUTH, Max-
Degree with 0% and Greedy with roughly 10%.
#src SISI SISI-relax NETS. Greedy Max-Degree
1 91.4 84.2 0 14.5 0
5 79.7 53.9 0 15.2 0
10 74.1 52.3 0 11.8 0
20 77.3 56.5 0 9.6 0
Table 3: True sources detected (%) with |VI | = 1000.
We also present the true source detected rates of different
methods in Tab. 3 since this is an important aspect (positive
rate) of ISI problem. The table shows accurate detection of
SISI and SISI-relax. More than 70% and 50% of true sources
are identified by SISI and SISI-relax respectively while NET-
SLEUTH and Max-Degree cannot detect any source.
Symmetric difference. Tab. 2 shows the E[D(S, τ, VI)] val-
ues where S is the returned solution of each algorithm with
various number of true sources and sizes of infection cas-
cades. In all the cases, SISI largely outperforms the other
methods and obtains very close values to the true sources.
The superiority of SISI against the SISI-relax and Greedy
confirms the good solution guarantee of SISI. NETSLEUTH
and Max-Degree optimize different criteria, i.e., description
length (MDL) and node degree, and thus show poor perfor-
mance in terms of symmetric difference. SISI-relax is consis-
tently the second best method and preserves very well the
performance of SISI.
Jaccard distance. We use QJD(S) as in [25] to evaluate
the algorithms and plot the results in Tab. 2. In this case,
the closer value of QJD(S) to 1 indicates better solution. In
terms of QJD(S), we observe the similar phenomena as mea-
sured by symmetric difference that SISI achieve drastically
better solution than the others and the results of SISI-relax
approach those of SISI very well with much fewer RR sets.
Comparing running time. Fig. 6 illustrates the run-
ning time of the algorithms in the previous experiments.
We see that SISI is slower than NETSLEUTH and SISI-relax
but the differences are minor while it provides by far better
accuracy than other algorithms. SISI-relax obtains possibly
the best balance among all: faster than NETSLEUTH and
providing good solution quality as shown previously.
5.3 Experiments on the IC model
Set up. We compare SISI with the dynamic program-
ming algorithm, temporarily called k-effector, in [20] when
the infection process follows the IC model. Similar to other
experiments, we simulate the infection process under the IC
model with 4 different numbers of sources, i.e., 1, 5, 10, 20
and run SISI and k-effector on the resulting cascades. For
each setting, we carry 10 simulations and report the average
results. Note that the solution for k-effector in [20] requires
the number of sources as an additional input parameter and
for simplicity, we provide the true number of sources used in
the simulation processes. SISI, however, do not require this
information. We report the results in Table 4.
#src
Symmetric Difference F1-measure
SISI k-effector Max-Deg. SISI k-effector Max-Deg.
1 6.6 18.4 42.3 0.57 0 0.02
5 55.1 103.4 176.9 0.53 0.02 0
10 25.2 72.6 154.1 0.49 0.03 0
20 203.7 295.2 384.7 0.52 0.05 0.03
Table 4: Comparison under the IC model.
Results. It is clear from Table 4 that SISI massively out-
performs k-effector in terms of both symmetric difference and
true source recovering ability. In summary, for any value of
the number of true sources k, SISI always returns solution
with symmetric difference equal half of the one returned by
k-effector. In terms of true source discovery ability, while
k-effector almost detects none of the true sources, SISI con-
sistently achieves the F1-measure of at least 50%.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We present SISI the first approximation algorithm for mul-
tiple source detection in general graphs which also works
very well in practice. The algorithm can be extended to
several other diffusion models and settings with little modi-
fication on the sampling procedure as outlined below.
Incomplete Observation [12, 15]. In many cases, we can
only observe the states (infected/not infected) for a subset
O ( V of nodes in the network. In those cases, we need
to modify the Fast TRIS sampling Algorithm in Line 1 and
pick a node u uniformly in O (instead of V ) and allow the
sources to be from VI or unknown state nodes.
However, the SISI cannot be directly adapted to non-
progessive models in which a node can switch from an in-
fected state into uninfected state. Thus approximation algo-
rithm for source detection in non-progressive models leaves
an open question and is among our future work.
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